Advanced economies are immersed in cyberspace. In 2016, 95 percent of businesses in OECD countries had a broadband internet connection; 77 percent had a web presence. More than half of the adult population had purchased a product or service online, compared to 36 per cent in 2010 4 .
As digitalization progresses, a growing share of production and consumption activities depend on connectivity. From an economist's point of view, there are evident analogies between the internet and the global financial system: both are tightly interconnected networks that provide lifeblood to the real economy, via transfers of information and funding, respectively.
Indeed, a financial crisis and a cyber crisis look alike in three key dimensions:
(i) vulnerabilities accumulate because of excessive risk-taking on the part of some agents, which eventually translates to systemic risk on account of interdependencies;
(ii) disruption can start at a single weak point and spread to the whole system in a matter of days or even hours;
(iii) the ultimate casualty is trust: once it is lost, transactions -and the whole economy -can grind to a halt as counterparties disconnect from each other.
Policy responses can be deployed to address these problems so that crises can be prevented or at least managed effectively. In the financial system, safeguards have been established over time:
examples are strict capital requirements for lenders, orderly resolution procedures for failing institutions, and collection of micro-level data aimed at identification of individual weak nodes 5 . They are not all-encompassing, but they do help reduce the risk.
Where cyberspace is concerned, this process is still in its infancy. Some results have been achieved with respect to (i) above. A small but insightful literature on the economics of cybersecurity 6 points out that distorted economic incentives, rather than technically sophisticated attacks, are at the heart of the problem.
Software is born vulnerable because of network externalities. For products such as operating systems and messaging platforms, the value increases with the size of the installed base; developers forego security as they scramble to get to the market first, attract a critical mass of users, and shut competition off. The absence of developer liability for buggy software does not help.
The market for cyber defense is plagued by information asymmetries. Vendors know more than their customers: they may have an opportunity to push whatever solution maximizes their own profit, independent of how effective it is. Finally, the cost of cyber attacks in many cases is not fully internalized by the immediate victims: for example, the owner of a vulnerable IoT device that gets recruited into a botnet typically has no statutory liability (yet) for damage caused by the botnet.
Some corrective measures have already been introduced, while others are being drafted. In the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) -coming into force in May 2018 -imposes steep fines to businesses that put the confidentiality of personal data at risk and mandates disclosure of breaches to both authorities and data subjects. The Directive on Security of Networks and Information Systems (NIS), also coming into force this year, introduces cyber protection requirements and incident disclosure obligations for key players in sectors such as energy, finance, and healthcare. A regulation proposal put forth by the European Commission envisages an EU-wide framework for security certification of hardware and software, fashioned after the notoriously strict CE scheme for safety, health and environmental protection.
These are necessary steps, but they are not enough; the effects of GDPR and NIS are confined to certain cases or sectors. More theoretical work is needed to define broader principles: generalized liability for damage caused to third parties may be a good idea, yet an ordinary citizen whose email account gets spoofed by phishers should probably not be forced to compensate victims.
With respect to (ii), there is still a significant knowledge gap about the location and interconnections of weak nodes. As pointed out by the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in 2017, "reliable, impartial, comprehensive and widely accessible" 7 data on the frequency and economic impact of cyber attacks are still rare. The same goes for information on network and economic connections, e.g. through digital and physical supply chains.
Evidence from the Bank of Italy's business surveys suggests that cyber risk may be concentrated among high-tech, non-ICT businesses 8 , which are more exposed and interesting to attackers compared to low-tech ones, and less proficient at defense than the ICT sector. The data also suggest that mass adoption of relatively simple internet-based solutions, such as e-commerce platforms, cloud computing services or IoT devices is a stronger risk factor than the selective adoption of advanced technologies, like machine learning or industrial robotics. These indications are vital in understanding which sectors of the economy need urgent intervention, be it in terms of awareness campaigns, dedicated incentives, or regulation.
The problem sub (iii) is the hardest to solve. After the 2009 financial meltdown, trust was only restored after a series of large-scale, highly controversial injections of public money in the banking system, and substantial reinforcement of a global governance framework which encompasses broad-based organizations such as the Financial Stability Board, the Bank for International
Settlements and the International Monetary Fund, regional institutions such as the European System of Financial Supervision, and national authorities.
In a cyber crisis, there is no immediately evident equivalent of a public-sector backstop.
Perhaps more importantly, a global governance framework is very hard to build because in cyberspace a crisis is generally triggered by an intentional act of aggression; an adversary is in the picture and may serve, directly or indirectly, the interests of a nation-state.
In this sense, the right comparison might be with currency or trade wars; the problem is mostly one of political, diplomatic and military relations, especially in a world where the weight of authoritarian governments increases. This is where input from economics is not sufficient and must be complemented by scholarship in the various facets of international relations.
